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ABSTRACT 
The paper conducts an analysis of the current 
counterdrug operation in Afghanistan and analyzes how these 
operations affect the counterinsurgent operations against 
the Taliban.  This analysis will be conducted by examining 
the Taliban’s control of opium cultivation to support their 
operations, determine how the people of Afghanistan rely 
upon the profits of opium for their livelihood, and 
identify possible solutions to the opium trade that will 
not alienate the people of Afghanistan from the Afghan 
government or Coalition Forces. This study will utilize a 
case study on Colombia in order to examine the policies 
implemented in an attempt to control the country’s illicit 
cocaine trade.  The intent of this study can be explained 
in four steps.  First is to examine counterdrug strategies.  
Second is to conduct a case study of Colombia in order to 
examine the strategies used to counter their illicit drug 
trade.  Third is to gain an understanding of what drives 
the Afghan people to produce opium, and how the Taliban 
exploits this need.  Fourth is the recommendation of a 
proper counterdrug strategy to be implemented in 
Afghanistan. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The paper conducts an analysis of the current 
counterdrug operation in Afghanistan and analyzes how these 
operations affect the counterinsurgent operations against 
the Taliban.  This analysis will be conducted by examining 
the Taliban’s control of opium cultivation to support their 
operations, determine how the people of Afghanistan rely 
upon the profits of opium for their livelihood, and 
identify possible solutions to the opium trade that will 
not alienate the people of Afghanistan from the Afghan 
government or Coalition Forces. This study will utilize a 
case study on Colombia in order to examine the policies 
implemented in an attempt to control the country’s illicit 
cocaine trade.  The intent of this study can be explained 
in four steps.  First is to examine counterdrug strategies.  
Second is to conduct a case study of Colombia in order to 
examine the strategies used to counter their illicit drug 
trade.  Third is to gain an understanding of what drives 
the Afghan people to produce opium, and how the Taliban 
exploits this need.  Fourth is the recommendation of a 
proper counterdrug strategy to be implemented in 
Afghanistan. 
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One of the key concerns in the United States today is 
the conflict in Afghanistan.  The focus in Afghanistan is 
to establish a competent Afghan government that can provide 
security to the country and its people.  One key factor 
that is hindering the progress of the Afghan government—
which must not be overlooked—is the opium trade.  The opium 
trade that occurs in Afghanistan ultimately affects the 
stability of the country’s government, and it provides 
financial support to the Taliban.  The opium problem will 
not be solved overnight; the United States needs to realize 
this ultimately will be a long and difficult process. 
B. PURPOSE OF THE THESIS 
The purpose of this study is to conduct an analysis of 
the current counterdrug operations in Afghanistan and 
analyze how these operations affect the counterinsurgent 
operations against the Taliban.  This analysis will be 
conducted by examining the Taliban’s control of opium 
cultivation to support their operations, determine how the 
people of Afghanistan rely upon the profits of opium for 
their livelihood, and identify possible solutions to the 
opium trade that will not alienate the people of 
Afghanistan from the Afghan government or Coalition Forces. 
This study will utilize a case study on Colombia in order 
to examine the policies implemented in an attempt to 
control the country’s illicit cocaine trade.  The intent of 
this study can be explained in four steps.  First is to 
examine counterdrug strategies.  Second is to conduct a 
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case study of Colombia in order to examine the strategies 
used to counter their illicit drug trade.  Third is to gain 
an understanding of what drives the Afghan people to 
produce opium, and how the Taliban exploits this need.  
Fourth is the recommendation of a proper counterdrug 
strategy to be implemented in Afghanistan.  
C. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will analyze the state-level policies used 
in Colombia to counter the country’s drug trade. This 
analysis will then be used to examine the current 
counterdrug plan utilized in Afghanistan and identify 
needed adjustments based off the successes and failures 
identified from the Colombian case study.    
This paper will begin with an in-depth discussion of 
multiple counterdrug strategies.  This discussion will 
examine the use of different counterdrug strategies and 
analyze the positive attributes, negative attributes, and 
resources needed for each strategy.  The strategies 
discussed will be supply side and demand side strategies. 
The case study of Colombia will be analyzed in order 
to draw possible conclusions on how to handle the opium 
problem within Afghanistan based off the results of the 
Colombian government’s counterdrug plan.  The case study on 
Colombia will focus on the country’s Plan Colombia.  This 
case study will examine the counterdrug techniques and the 
effectiveness of Plan Colombia.  The techniques that will 
be examined will include crop eradication and alternative 




policies will be analyzed in order to identify effective 
and feasible strategies that could be used in Afghanistan 
against the country’s opium trade.  
Colombia was chosen as a case study due to its 
similarities to Afghanistan and the country’s long history 
of the counterdrug operations.  Colombia and Afghanistan 
may not have similar terrain but they both contain very 
rural environments, which are used to cultivate their 
respective illegal products.  Each country is also faced 
with the threat of non-state actors that rely on the 
financial support of the illegal products.  Colombia and 
Afghanistan also share a special relationship with the 
United States that provides financial, military, and 
strategic support to each country.  The similarity that 
Colombia has to Afghanistan may provide beneficial insight 
on how to control the Opium Problem of Afghanistan based on 
the country’s past experiences. 
An in-depth examination of Afghanistan’s drug trade 
will then be discussed.  This inspection of Afghanistan’s 
drug trade will begin by discussing the Afghan drug culture 
beginning with the country’s reliance on the trade 
following the conflict with the Soviet Union.  The 
examination of the Afghan drug culture will be followed by 
a look at the Taliban’s use of opium to fund their regime 
and current operations in Afghanistan.  This section will 
end with an analysis of the current counterdrug operations 
conducted in Afghanistan.    
This paper will conclude by providing policy 
recommendations gained from the lessons learned from the 
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Colombian case study and it will be identified if it is 
feasible to implement these policies in Afghanistan. 
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II. COUNTERDRUG STRATEGIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to understand how an effective counterdrug 
operation can be implemented in Afghanistan, one must 
understand the strategies that are used in these 
operations.  This understanding of the counterdrug 
operation will allow the proper use of techniques while 
facilitating the current counterinsurgency operations.  For 
years, there have been two distinct ways of conducting 
counterdrug operations, supply-side and demand-side 
strategies.  The use and effectiveness of each of these 
strategies has been debated for years.  This chapter will 
analyze each of these strategies by looking at the 
different techniques involved, and by analyzing the 
positive attributes, negative attributes, and resources 
needed for each technique.  
B. SUPPLY-SIDE STRATEGY 
The supply-side strategy has been the key factor in 
the United States’ war on drugs.  This has been 
demonstrated by the United States’ support of counterdrug 
operations in South America.  The theory behind supply-side 
strategy is to target the production and distribution of 
narcotics in order to reduce the supply of them.  This 
reduction is intended to have two effects: the reduction of 
the availability of the narcotic to consumers will drive up 
the price resulting in the reduction of drug users and the 
disruption of production and trafficking will increase 
 6
production costs resulting in a decrease in demand.1  This 
can be accomplished through a multitude of different 
techniques.  The techniques to be discussed are crop 
eradication, alternative development programs, and 
interdiction.  
1. Crop Eradication 
Crop eradication consists of the actual destruction of 
a drug crop.  This can be accomplished through two 
techniques, manual eradication or aerial eradication.  
These techniques have been utilized heavily throughout 
South America in countries such as Colombia, Peru, and 
Bolivia. 
a. Manual Eradication 
Manual eradication is the process of removing 
drug crops by hand in order to destroy the crop.  This form 
of eradication will normally be carried out by police or 
military eradication forces, which will positively identify 
a drug crop location and then, by hand, destroy the crop.  
This is the most effective form of eradication due to the 
hands-on effort and the effectiveness of the destruction.  
The crop can be destroyed by completely pulling the plant 
out of the ground.2  This does not allow the farmer any way 
to recuperate the crop and forces a new planting cycle or 
that the farmer stops the illicit activity.  Manual 
eradication may be very effective; however, it has four 
                     
1 Michael Eric Hobaugh, “Colombia's War on Drugs: Can Peru Provide 
the Recipe for Success” (Postgraduate thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA, 2000), 6. 
2 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Colombia Coca Cultivation 
Survey, June 2009 Survey (New York: United Nations, 2009), 74. 
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major drawbacks:  a large force is needed to execute the 
operation, the operations are high risk, there is an 
increased possibility for corruption, and it is a very slow 
process.   
Manual eradication is a manpower-intensive 
operation.  A force must be large enough to secure the area 
and to carry out the actual process of destroying the crop.  
This process can be extremely dangerous, especially when 
conducted in hostile areas.  The eradication force must 
deal with the danger of drug traffickers who are attempting 
to protect their crop and, at times, deal with insurgent 
forces who are protecting the drug, as happens in 
Afghanistan.  Manual eradication also provides the 
opportunity for corruption to flourish.  In some cases, 
such as in Afghanistan, eradication forces have been bribed 
not to destroy the farmer’s entire drug crop.3  The final 
negative attribute of manual eradication is the amount of 
time it takes to execute this type of operation.  Many 
times, drug crops will be placed in difficult terrain away 
from the population, forcing the eradication force to walk 
to the crop location.  The resources needed for manual 
eradication will consist of a highly-mobile force able to 
secure the area, and a large number of personnel to 
actually conduct the eradication process. 
b. Aerial Eradication 
Aerial eradication is the process of destroying 
crops through the use of chemical agents distributed by 
                     
3 John Lee Anderson, "The Taliban's Opium War; Letter from 
Afghanistan," The New Yorker, July 9, 2007, 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/07/09/070709fa_fact_anderson 
(accessed May 9, 2009).  
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low-flying aircraft.  This form of eradication is not as 
effective as manual eradication but it is able to cover a 
larger area in a shorter amount of time. The primary agent 
used during aerial eradication is a chemical called 
glyphosate, which is a weed killer.4  Glyphosate is produced 
commercially and is used throughout the world for personal 
use in gardens.5  When aerial eradication is properly 
utilized, glyphosphate is able to interrupt one or more 
harvests.6  
Two main drawbacks when using aerial eradication 
are the effectiveness of the spray, and the alienating 
effect it has upon the population.  The effectiveness of 
aerial eradication can be reduced by planting the illicit 
crops interspersed in licit crops, applying protective 
substances on the leaves, washing the leaves, or if the 
aerial spraying is followed by a rain storm.7  In many 
areas, the spraying of illicit crops has an alienating 
effect upon the population.  Normally, these crops are 
grown in rural areas where the population has a limited 
education.  They perceive the spraying of the illicit crops 
as an attack upon them by the government.  Often, they will 
blame any sickness, human or livestock, on the aerial 
                     
4 Thomas Schweich, "Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?" New York Times. 
July 27, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/27/magazine/27AFGHAN-
t.html (accessed May 9, 2009). 
5 Ibid.  
6 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Colombia Coca Cultivation 




eradication.8  This ultimately turns the population against 
the government and often pushes the population into more 
isolated areas, where possible. 
2. Alternative Development Programs 
Alternative development programs provide economic 
alternatives and infrastructure to rural populations in 
order to alleviate the population’s dependency on the 
economics of illicit drugs.9  Some ways in which alternative 
development programs assist the rural population are by 
building infrastructure such as roads to assist the farms 
in getting their legal crops to the market; providing 
education to rural farmers on improved farming techniques; 
provide new technology such as fertilizers and seeds; 
provide credit to allow the population to break their 
reliance on the finances from illicit crops; crop 
substitution and subsides.10  
The positive attribute of alternative development 
programs is that it avoids alienating the population as 
compared to eradication efforts.  These programs provide an 
opportunity for the rural population to help themselves and 
provide an alternative to the illicit crop. A byproduct of 
                     
8 Halima Kazem, "Crop Spraying Draws Controversy in Afghan Drug 
Fight," The Christian Science Monitor, January 25, 2005, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0125/p07s01-wosc.html (accessed May 2006, 
2009). 
9 Menno Vellinga, The Political Economy of the Drug Industry: Latin 
America and the International System. (Gainsville: University Press of 
Florida, 2004), 321. 
10 Vabda Felbab-Brown, "Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Undermines 
Counterterrorism," The Washington Quarterly, 2005, 
http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.nps.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v028
/28.4felbab-brown.html (accessed October 11, 2009), 6. 
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this effort is the strengthening of the community through 
the infrastructural improvements in the area. 
The negative attributes of the alternative development 
programs are that it is a long-term process, a great deal 
of security is needed, and often the improvements 
implemented through the program facilitate the operations 
of the drug traffickers.  These programs are not 
accomplished overnight.  The type of development needed in 
some rural area will need to take place over many years.  
This requires large sums of money to support the programs, 
a great deal of support from the local government and other 
supporting agencies.11  Another negative attribute is the 
need for security for these programs to be successful.  
Agencies need freedom of maneuver to improve the 
infrastructure in these rural areas.  Personnel need to be 
able to safely provide education to the rural population 
without the fear of being killed or kidnapped, and the 
population must be able to utilize the tools provided by 
the alternative development without the fear of reprisal 
from the drug traffickers.12  The final negative attribute 
is that the alternative development programs often 
facilitate the operations of the drug traffickers.13  The 
infrastructure improvements, such as roads; can also be 
utilized by traffickers to facilitate the movement of the 
illicit product to market, ultimately reducing production 
costs on the traffickers. 
                     
11 Menno Vellinga, The Political Economy of the Drug Industry: Latin 
America and the International System, (Gainsville: University Press of 
Florida, 2004), 322. 
12 Ibid., 322. 
13 Ibid., 325. 
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3. Interdiction 
Interdiction is the direct targeting of drug labs, 
precursors and drug traffickers.  This action focuses 
directly on the key players operating at the middle and 
upper levels of the drug trade.  These types of operations 
limit the amount of alienation upon the local population as 
compared to eradication.  The difficulty of these types of 
operation is the reliance upon local intelligence to 
identify the targets, the flexibility of the drug 
traffickers, and the needed security to execute the 
operations.   
In order to conduct interdiction operations the target 
must be identified through proper intelligence.  This 
information often is gained through local human 
intelligence.  It is difficult to build reliable networks 
within these areas in order to provide actionable 
intelligence.  When reliable intelligence is gained another 
problem often emerges, the flexibility of the traffickers.  
Often if the trafficker knows he has been compromised he is 
able to quickly close operations and move to a new and 
secure location.  The final negative aspect of interdiction 
is the needed security to execute this type of operation, 
especially in areas that maintain a high level of hostile 
activity.  These operations will often need to be treated 
as combat operations resulting in the use of a highly 
trained force.   
The resources needed for interdiction operations can 
be outlined by the negative aspects of the operation.  The 
need for reliable intelligence results in the needed 
resource of a highly effective intelligence network.  This 
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will often result in the need for a large amount of man 
hours to build relationships with informants and resources 
to determine if these informants are reliable.  A large 
amount of resources will be required in order to guarantee 
the needed security for these operations.  The main 
resource requirement will be the highly trained force to 
implement the operations. A large amount of resources will 
need to be provided in order to train and equip this force.   
C. DEMAND-SIDE STRATEGY 
As the name implies, demand-side strategy focuses on 
the demand or the need for the drugs by the user. In many 
cases it is the developed countries that produce the 
greatest demand for drugs and it is the developing 
countries that must fill the supply of these products.  By 
utilizing the demand-side strategy, the emphasis is taken 
off those countries that supply the drugs, the developing 
countries, and placed on the countries that are creating 
the demand for the drugs, normally, the developed 
countries.  Demand-side strategy focuses on two techniques 
to reduce the drug flow: education and treatment.14 
1. Education 
The intent of education is to prevent the population 
from becoming users by explaining the dangers of drug use.  
This education comes from public service messages such as 
the “Just Say No” campaign of the 1980s, school programs, 
and direct prevention from parents and mentors.  Education 
on drug abuse aims at accurately informing the public of 
                     
14 Michael Eric Hobaugh, “Colombia's War on Drugs: Can Peru Provide 
the Recipe for Success” (Postgraduate thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA, 2000), 8. 
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the effects of drugs and drug abuse.  This preventive 
education is conducted in order to allow the public to make 
informed decisions concerning drug abuse with the intent to 
reduce the amount of consumers resulting in the decrease in 
demand of narcotics. 
The effectiveness of education is debatable.  There 
has been criticism of programs such the Drug Abuse 
Resistance Education (DARE) program.  The effectiveness of 
these programs was analyzed in a RAND report in 1999.  This 
report identifies that these types of programs can reduce 
lifetime drug consumption by a relatively small amount, 
between 2% and 11%.15  The benefit of these programs is that 
they are inexpensive to run especially when compared to 
techniques utilized in the supply-side strategy. 
2. Treatment 
The intent of treatment is to heal the user through 
drug treatment programs.  The difficulty with treatment 
programs is that the user needs to be the one who 
determines they have a problem and might search out 
treatment opportunities.  Two types of treatment programs 
exist: outpatient treatment and residential.  Outpatient 
treatments are relatively short and inexpensive compared to 
residential treatments, which are longer and more 
expensive.16  Treatment programs have an 80% success rate of  
 
                     
15 RAND Drug Policy and Research Center, “The Benefits and Costs of 
Drug Use Prevention,” RAND, 1999, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB6007/index1.html (accessed 
December 10, 2009). 
16 C. Peter Rydell and Susan S. Everingham, Controlling Supply Versus 
Demand Programs (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), 20. 
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keeping individuals off drugs while they are in the 
program; however, this rate drops once the individuals 
leave the program.17 
When comparing the treatment programs to supply-side 
programs, it can be shown that the treatment programs are 
more efficient.  This was demonstrated in a RAND study of 
cocaine in 1999.  This study identified that it would take 
$783 million a year to reduce cocaine consumption by 1% 
using supply-side techniques.18  The same study states that 
it would only take $34 million a year to reach the same 
results utilizing treatment programs.19   
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided a description of the different 
strategies and techniques used for counterdrug operations.  
Neither the supply-side strategy nor the demand-side 
strategy has resulted in successfully ending a country’s 
drug problem.  Examining these two strategies, one could 
identify the demand-side strategy as more beneficial due to 
the results from the reduction of consumption by the end 
user.  Could the demand-side strategy affect the opium 
trade of Afghanistan?  The opium trade of Afghanistan is 
not focused in one country but throughout the world.  While 
Afghanistan produces 92% of the world’s opium, the primary 
consumers of Afghanistan’s opium are found in Europe, 
Russia and Iran.20  It is not realistic to mandate a demand-
                     
17 Rydell, Controlling Supply Versus Demand Programs, 24. 
18 Ibid., 24. 
19 Ibid., 24. 
20 Human Security Report Project Afghanistan Conflict Monitor, 
October 2009, http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/drugs.html#docs2 
(accessed December 10, 2009). 
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side strategy to all these countries.  It would be more 
beneficial to take more of a balanced approach to the opium 
trade in Afghanistan.  Demand-side strategy should be 
implemented in countries consuming opium from Afghanistan, 
where possible.  It will take time to initiate these 
programs and to see the results from the programs.  Supply-
side strategies should also be initiated to reduce the 
production of opium within Afghanistan.  Through the 
analysis of Colombia’s war on drugs, one may be able to 
gain insight into how possibly to incorporate a supply-side 
strategy in Afghanistan.   
 16
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III. COLOMBIA CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The country of Colombia is considered the cocaine 
capitol of the world.  Within the borders of Colombia, 51% 
of the world’s cocaine is produced, a large amount of which 
is exported to the United States.21  This problem contains 
four major players: the coca farmers; the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); the Colombian Government, 
and the United States.  The coca farmers have become 
reliant upon the cultivation of coca for survival, the FARC 
has become dependent upon the cocaine trade to fund 
operations and the Colombian government has had to fight 
the war on drugs due to pressure from the United States.  
The United States has become involved in this conflict as a 
result of its growing dependency upon cocaine.   
Is Colombia beginning to win this war on cocaine?  
Colombia has shown a decrease in coca cultivation from 2007 
to 2008 by 18%, the cocaine production has decreased by 
28%, and there has been a 26% drop in households that grow 
coca.22  Another promising sign of Colombia’s success is the 
combination of the rising price of cocaine and the 
declining purity of the product, which are indicators of a 
decreasing supply.23  These signs are promising, but how did 
the country of Colombia get to this point?  This chapter 
                     
21 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2009. 
Annual World Drug Report (New York: United Nations Publication Sales, 
2009), 68. 
22 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Colombia Coca 
Cultivation Survey, June 2009 Survey (New York: United Nations, 2009), 
3. 
23 Ibid., 3. 
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will investigate the policies and strategies used.  This 
chapter will discuss Plan Colombia, which was implemented 
by Colombian President Pastrana in 1999.24  A brief 
discussion of the background to Plan Colombia will be 
conducted, the objectives of the program will be examined, 
counterdrug policies of the program will be analyzed and 
then the results of each program will discussed. 
B. PLAN COLOMBIA 
1. Background 
Plan Colombia was conceived by Colombian President 
Pastrana.  This plan was intended to promote the peace 
process between Colombia and the FARC, revive the Colombian 
economy, and combat the Colombian drug problem.  The price 
tag slated for this project was $7.5 billion, $4 billion of 
this was to be funded by the Colombian government and $3.5 
billion was to be funded through international aid.25  The 
basic concept of this plan was for the Colombian government 
to gain control of the entire country through military 
force (40% was controlled by guerilla forces at the time) 
while at the same time eradicate coca crops grown 
throughout the region.26  Following this phase coca farmers 
would be offered funding for alternative crops in order to 
prevent their return to the coca crop.  The intended result 
would be the control of Colombia by the Colombian 
                     
24 United States State Department, Fact Sheet: Plan Colombia, March 
28, 2000. 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/colombia/fs_000328_plancolombia.ht
ml (accessed October 31, 2009). 
25 Garry Leech, "Plan Colombia: A Closer Look," Colombia Journal, 
July 2000. http://colombiajournal.org/special-reports/plancolombia 
(accessed October 31, 2009). 
26 Ibid. 
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government and a reduction of the cocaine produced and 
exported from Colombia to the United States.   
2. United States’ Involvement 
The U.S. support of Plan Colombia was based on five 
components: improving governance and respect for human 
rights, expansion of counter-narcotic operations into 
southern Colombia, alternative economic development, 
increased interdiction in Colombia and the region, and 
assistance for the Colombian National Police.27  The first 
component, improving governing capacity and respect for 
human rights, focused on education programs on human rights 
and training government officials to investigate human 
rights cases.28  The second component, expansion of counter-
narcotics operations into Southern Colombia, focused on 
improving the military capability of combating narcotics.29  
This component trained and equipped two additional counter-
narcotic battalions with the mission to protect the 
Colombian National Police while they carry out counterdrug 
operations.30  In addition, this component provided 30 
Blackhawk and 33 Huey helicopters for counterdrug 
                     
27 United States State Department, Fact Sheet: Plan Colombia, March 
28, 2000. 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/colombia/fs_000328_plancolombia.ht
ml (accessed October 31, 2009). 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 United States State Department. Fact Sheet: Plan Colombia. March 
28, 2000. 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/colombia/fs_000328_plancolombia.ht
ml (accessed October 31, 2009). 
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operations.31  The third component, alternate economic 
development, focused on providing economic alternatives to 
former coca farmers.32  This component also intends to 
support the building of infrastructure such as schools, 
roads, and medical clinics.33  The fourth component, 
increased interdiction in Colombia and the region, by 
providing radar upgrades and improvement in intelligence 
capabilities of the Colombians in order to interdict the 
drug traffickers.34  The fifth component, assistance for the 
Colombian National Police, focused on upgrading and 
purchasing aircraft to conduct aerial eradication.35   
From examining the five components, it appears the 
United States is assisting with all aspects of Plan 
Colombia, from judicial reform to military assistance.  
Although, when one analyzes the allocation of funds to 
Colombia, it appears the overwhelming priority is military 
assistance, as shown in Table 1.  This unbalanced approach 
gives the impression that the United States’ support of 
Plan Colombia was centered on the military aspect of 
assisting the Colombian government fight the FARC instead 
of conducting counterdrug operations. 
 
 
                     
31 United States State Department. Fact Sheet: Plan Colombia. March 
28, 2000. 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/colombia/fs_000328_plancolombia.ht




35 Ibid.  
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Table 1.   Allocation of the Colombian package 
Designation Allocation(in millions 
of U.S. dollars) 
Percent 
Military assistance $519.2 60.35 




Aid for displaced 
persons 
$37.5 4.36 
Human rights $51.0 5.93 
Judicial reform $13.0 1.51 
Law enforcement/ rule 
of law 
$45.0 5.23 
Peace $3.0 0.35 
Total $860.3 100.0 
Source: Eduardo Pizarro and Pilar Gaitan. "Plan Colombia and the Andean 
Regional Initiative: Lights and Shadows." In Addicted to Failure, by 
Brian Loveland, 53-79. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 
2006, 66. 
 
3. Counterdrug Strategies  
The focus of Plan Colombia was to eradicate the 
cocaine supply produced in the jungles of Colombia.  The 
main techniques utilized against the cocaine fields of 
Colombia were manual eradication, aerial eradication, and 
alternate development programs.   
a. Manual Eradication 
Manual eradication is the most effective form of 
crop eradication due to the coca plant being completely 
uprooted from the ground.  Once the coca bush is uprooted 
it could take up to eight months for a farmer to replant 
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and produce a new crop of coca.36  As stated previously, 
this is a time-consuming and dangerous activity for the 
eradication force, especially in areas with high FARC 
activity.  The level of manual eradication was extremely 
limited prior to 2004.  This limited amount of eradication 
can be correlated to the level of violence and high 
activity of the FARC prior to 2005, which correlates to 
Colombia’s offensive against the FARC during operation 
Patriota (Figures 1 and 2).37  
Figure 1.   Colombia, Coca cultivation and reported 
eradication/spraying (hectares),  
1994-2008 
 
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. World Drug Report 





                     
36 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Colombia Coca 
Cultivation Survey. June 2009 Survey, New York: United Nations, 2009, 
74. 
37 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, The Threat of Narco-
Trafficking in the Americas, October 2008(New York: United Nations, 
2008). 
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Figure 2.   Colombia murders per 100,000 in population 
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The Threat of Narco-
Trafficking in the Americas. October 2008, New York: United Nations, 
2008, 31. 
 
Manual eradication operations were carried out by 
Mobile Eradication Groups, the Anti Narcotic Police, the 
Army, and the National Police.  These forces can be very 
effective against coca; however, they can have a negative 
effect upon the Colombian population.  Upon the completion 
of manual eradication, the coca farmer is left with their 
livelihood destroyed.  The farmer has to make a decision to 
turn away from the growing of coca and turn to a legal 
crop; replant his coca crop; or pick up his family and push 
further into the jungle where it is more difficult for the 
eradication forces to find his illegal crop.  Another 
alternative for the coca farmer is to turn to organizations 
such as the FARC to provide protection against the 
eradication forces.  Many times, this problem is 
exacerbated from the actions of the eradication force.  
Frequently, the only impression the rural farmer has of the 
Colombian government comes from the actions of this force.  
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One coca farmer is quoted as saying, “People fear the 
eradicators, they (the government eradication force) are 
abusive.”38  It has also been stated that these forces have 
been known to take food and other goods from the farmers.  
These harsh actions of the eradication force are often 
increased when they are operating in areas with heavy FARC 
activity.  In these areas, the eradication force often sees 
the farmers as supporters of the FARC.39  Without an 
alternative to growing coca, the farmer is often forced to 
continue the cycle of growing coca for his family and 
himself to survive. 
b. Aerial Eradication 
The primary form of eradication found in Colombia 
is aerial eradication.  This form of eradication is safer 
and more efficient than manual eradication.  With aerial 
eradication the area to be eradicated does not need to be 
secured with ground troops, preventing any confrontation 
with opposition forces such as the FARC.  Without the 
reliance upon ground forces, aerial eradication is able to 
quickly deploy to coca growing areas, allowing the 
eradication of larger areas of coca growing compared to 
manual eradication.  As stated previously, the drawback to 
aerial eradication is that it does not target the root of 
the plant but the leaves.  Often farmers can wash the 
                     
38 Center for International Policy's Colombia Program, "Initial 
Observations about "Integrated Action" in Colombia," Plan Colombia and 
Beyond. June 10, 2009. http://www.cipcol.org/?p=904 (accessed October 
30, 2009). 
39 Journeyman Pictures, "Drug Wars-Colombia," YOU TUBE. August 7, 
2007, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DDvwn83xK0A&NR=1 (accessed October 
30, 2009). 
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pesticide off the plant or they will prune the plant to 
allow it to grow back rather than completely die off.40  
Figure 3.   Colombia aerial eradication (hectares) 
Sources: United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. Colombia Coca 
Cultivation Survey 2005. Annual Coca Cultivation Survey, New York: 
United Nations, 2005.; United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. 
Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey June 2006. Annual Coca Cultivation 
Survey, New York : United Nation , 2006.; United Nations Office of 
Drugs and Crime. Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey June 2007. Annual 
Coca Cultivation Survey, New York: United Nations, 2007.; United 
Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. Coca Cultivation in the Andrean 
Region: A Survey of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru . Annual Coca 
Cultivation Survey June 2008, New York: United Nations, 2008.; United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Colombia Coca Cultevation Survey 
June 2009. Annual Coca Survey, New York: United Nations, 2009. 
 
The use of aerial eradication in Colombia has 
resulted in the destruction of coca fields; however, it has 
also effected the production of legal crops.  Reports have 
surfaced that spraying has affected livestock of farmers 
resulting in the increased alienation of the population.41  
This by-product of aerial spraying cannot be overlooked.  
                     
40 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Colombia Coca 
Cultevation Survey June 2009, Annual Coca Survey (New York: United 
Nations, 2009), 77. 
41 "Vistahermosa and Puerto Toledo," The Center for International 
Policy's Colombia Program, May 31, 2009, http://www.cipcol.org/?p=880 
(accessed October 30, 2009). 
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The result can push local farmers away from the government 
of Colombia and force them to support the activities of the 
FARC. 
c. Alternative Development Programs 
Alternative development programs have been 
minimally used throughout Plan Colombia until the 
implementation of the Plan de Consolidacion Integral de la 
Macarena in late 2007.42  Prior to the execution of this 
plan, a limited amount of alternative development programs 
were implemented and presented positive results.  One such 
plan is the Forest Ranger Families project. 
(1)  Forest Ranger Families Project. The 
Forest Ranger Families project was implemented by the 
Colombian government in 2003.43  The program was established 
for “rural, indigenous or Afro-Colombian families that are 
involved in or at risk of becoming involved in illicit crop 
cultivation within strategic ecosystems.”44  The concept 
behind this project was to pay families to not grow illicit 
crops.  Families would be paid $1,600 per year for three 
years for this service.45  From 2003 to 2005, 1,249,960 
hectares were protected from the growth of illicit crops.46  
The primary selling point for this project was the price 
                     
42 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Colombia Coca 
Cultivation Survey, June 2009 Survey (New York: United Nations, 2009), 
79. 
43 Asociacion Inter Americana para la Defensa del Ambiente, 
Alternative Development Strategies in Colombia: The Need to Move Beyond 
Illicit Crop Spraying, http://www.aida-
americas.org/templates/aida/uploads/docs/AIDA-EX_SUMM_ALT_DEVT_06-





tag.  On average, this program protected a hectare at the 
cost of $141 compared to aerial eradication costing $1,682 
per hectare.47  One issue with this program is that it makes 
direct payments to the families for not growing illicit 
crops.  This program does not provide the opportunity for 
the family to improve themselves through legal crops or 
improvements in their local infrastructure.  This program 
sets the family up for failure by not providing an 
alternate source of income other than payments from the 
Colombian government.  Once the funding ceases for this 
project the family’s only alternative will be to turn back 
to the cultivation of coca.  
(2)  Plan de Consolidacion Integral de la 
Macarena. A program that has demonstrated great promise in 
the battle against drugs in Colombia is the Plan de 
Consolidation Integral de la Macarena (PCIM).  This program 
is currently focused on the Meta department, which, in 
2007, was the third-largest coca producer in the country.48  
The intent of the program is to “recover the institutional 
control of the territory and to establish the necessary 
conditions for the full exercise of the citizen’s rights.”49  
The Colombian government decided to combine their fight 
                     
47 Asociacion Inter Americana para la Defensa del Ambiente, 
Alternative Development Strategies in Colombia: The Need to Move Beyond 
Illicit Crop Spraying. 
48 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Colombia Coca 
Cultivation Survey, June 2009 Survey (New York: United Nations, 2009), 
79. 
49 Ibid., 79. 
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against coca and guerrillas with state building.50  This is 
demonstrated by Vice Minister of Defense Sergio Jaramillo, 
when he stated, “We had to find a way to solve the security 
problem and the coca problem at the same time because they 
feed off each other.”51  This plan appears to embody the 
original intent of Plan Colombia by extending the 
legitimate state authority to areas in Colombia by 
“creating a permanent state security presence in retaken 
zones; developing a visible and robust civilian response 
alongside security operations in these areas; timing and 
coordinating the work of various actors in consolidating 
security, building a sustained state presence, and 
promoting economic development; and disrupting narcotics 
trafficking, which contributes to the strength of illegal 
groups in the zone.”52  
The PCIM was executed in a four-step 
process: (1) Colombian military would secure the municipal 
urban areas, (2) the police would replace the military in 
the urban areas, providing security and rule of law, (3) 
the military would push out into the surrounding rural 
areas, clearing them of insurgent activity, and (4) once 
the rural area is secure the forced and volunteer 
                     
50 Juan Forero, "Colombian Farmers Get Broad Incentives to Forgo Coca 
Crops," The Washington Post, May 22, 2009, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/05/21/AR2009052104318.html (accessed October 
30, 2009). 
51 Ibid. 
52 Peter DeShazo, Phillip McLean, and Johanna Mendelson Forman, 
Colombia's Plan de Consolidacion Integral de la Macarena, Report of the 
CSIS Americas Program (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic 
International Studies, 2009), 1. 
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eradication would begin.53  The provided security in the 
area and the eradication of the coca, as explained in 
Colombia’s Plan de Consolidacion Integral de la Macarena, 
“will lead to an expansion of state presence and the rise 
of a legal economy.”54  At the earliest possible moment in 
this process five areas will be focused on: institutional 
development, citizenship, and governability; property 
rights and territorial order; infrastructure and 
connectivity; access to public goods and social services; 
and economic/business development.55  The reason for 
focusing on these five areas is to provide a state presence 
within this region that does not involve the military, 
police, or eradication efforts.56  In order to facilitate 
the function of these areas, civilian employees will enter 
the region as soon as it is safe enough to establish 
contact with the local populace.  These civilians will 
engage the populace in order to discuss the kinds of 
“projects and activities most needed in each community.”57  
When these projects are agreed upon, letters of agreement 
are signed by the local community, municipal mayors, and 
representatives of the government.  This process identifies 
two key factors of the program.  The use of civilians 
allows the populace to become accustomed to working with 
government officials other than the military.  A sense of 
                     
53 Peter DeShazo, Phillip McLean, and Johanna Mendelson Forman, 
Colombia's Plan de Consolidacion Integral de la Macarena, Report of the 
CSIS Americas Program (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic 
International Studies, 2009), 2. 
54 Ibid., 2. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., 6. 
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trust begins to build between the community and the 
government.  The second factor is that this process allows 
“local buy in” to the projects.58  Through this local buy in 
it is not an outsider forcing a plan upon the local 
populace, which might not even be needed by the community.  
The goal behind these projects is “to spend small and fast 
in order to build confidence and provide rural people in 
areas where coca cultivation previously dominated with a 
“ladder” with which to climb out of the illegal (narcotic) 
economy.”59   
The decrease in coca cultivation for the 
year of 2008 can be linked to the success of the PCIM 
program.  Coca production dropped from 10,386 (hectares) to 
5,525 (hectares) a 47% drop in coca cultivation.60  This 
drop in cultivation can be linked to the increased 
government presence in this region.  The increase in the 
military and police has provided security to the area, 
which has allowed an increase in manual eradication; 3,768 
hectares in 2007 to 7,972 hectares.61  The influx of local 
projects in order to build social capital within the 
community will need continued observation to determine if 
this has facilitated the decrease in coca cultivation. 
 
 
                     
58 Peter DeShazo, Phillip McLean, and Johanna Mendelson Forman, 
Colombia's Plan de Consolidacion Integral de la Macarena, Report of the 
CSIS Americas Program (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic 
International Studies, 2009), 6. 
59 Ibid., 6. 
60 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Colombia Coca 
Cultivation Survey, June 2009 Survey (New York: United Nations, 2009), 
29. 
61 Ibid., 29. 
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Cultivation Survey June 2008, New York: United Nations, 2008.; United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Colombia Coca Cultevation Survey 
June 2009. Annual Coca Survey, New York: United Nations, 2009. 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has provided an overview of Colombia’s 
counterdrug operations from the implementation of Plan 
Colombia to the execution of Plan de Consolidacion Integral 
de la Macarena (PCIM).  The Colombian case study 
demonstrates that the excessive use of manual and aerial 
eradication cannot successfully end the cultivation of an 
illicit product.  The use of eradication in many cases 
resulted in alienating the rural population of Colombia and 
directing their support toward non-state actors such as the 
FARC.  Utilizing alternative development programs, as in 
the case of the PCIM program, has resulted in the 
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successful decline of coca cultivation.  This program 
provided security, governance, and alternate forms of 
income to the population, allowing them to turn away from 
the cultivation of coca and non-state actors. The coca 
cultivation in Colombia has drastically dropped in 2008.  
This can be attributed to the increase in security, which 
was facilitated by an increase in governance in rural areas 
and the implementation of the PCIM program.  These factors 
can continue to decrease the coca cultivation within 
Colombia if correctly balanced.  Continued security within 
the rural areas must continue in order for state governance 
to facilitate local programs such as PCIM.  These programs 
provide the coca farmers alternatives to the cultivation of 
coca.  Limited manual eradication must still be utilized 
once coca farmers have been provided an alternate source of 
income to coca cultivation.  The continued observation of 
this balanced approach will be needed.  Over the next year 
the PCIM program should strengthen and provide a continued 
decrease in coca production in this area.  If this decrease 
continues, the PCIM program could be utilized in other 
areas of Colombia and, possibly, as a model in other parts 
of the world facing similar illicit drug troubles. 
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IV. AFGHANISTAN’S OPIUM TRADE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Today, Afghanistan produces approximately 92% of the 
world’s opium.62  This large quantity of opium produced by 
Afghanistan has led to a culture dependent upon the drug in 
many ways. Over the years, the Afghan people have relied 
upon opium to feed their families, support their 
government, and fight wars.  This chapter will take a look 
at how Afghanistan has become reliant upon opium.  This 
chapter will discuss the history of opium in Afghanistan, 
from its introduction to the country, to the ways in which 
the Taliban has been utilizing the product.  The chapter 
will conclude by examining the current counterdrug 
operation in Afghanistan.   
B. HISTORY OF OPIUM IN AFGHANISTAN 
1. Opium and the Soviet Conflict 
Opium was first introduced to Afghanistan by Alexander 
the Great around 330 BC.63  Early on, Afghanistan’s terrain 
and climate were identified as an excellent environment for 
the cultivation of poppy.  The cultivation of poppy for 
profit in Afghanistan did not occur until the early 1900s.64  
During this time, the Afghan opium trade was controlled by 
                     
62 Anand Gopal, "csmonitor.com," Afghanistan's Soaring Drug Trade 
Hits Home, March 13, 2008, http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0313/p04s01-
wogn.htm?print=true (accessed June 11, 2009). 
63 Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror: How heroin is bankrolling the 
Taliban and al Qaeda (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2009), 29. 
64 Antonio M. Costa, "UNODC.org," The Opium Economy in Afghanistan, 
January 2003, www.unodc.org/pdf/publications/afg_opium_economy_www.pdf 
(accessed April 18, 2009), 88. 
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the ruling family and mainly exported to Iran.65  Even at 
this point in history, opium was not produced in a large 
quantity.  Compared to China’s production of 6,000 tons in 
1932, Afghanistan only produced 75 tons.66  Afghanistan did 
not become a main producer of opium until the late 1970s 
and early 1980s.  In the 1970s, the three main producers of 
the world’s opium supply (Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey) began 
to implement bans and severe drug controls in their 
countries.67  This created a vacuum in the world opium 
market, which Afghanistan was ready to fill.  Two factors 
pushed Afghanistan into becoming the world’s lead in opium 
production, and both of these were a result of the Soviet 
invasion in 1979. First, when the Soviets invaded, they 
were countered by the Mujahedeen. The Mujahedeen received 
support from outside sponsors; however, they also began to 
lean on the increased Afghanistan opium production, due to 
the opium vacuum, to finance their operations. The 
increased participation of the Mujahedeen helped to build 
the opium trafficking network and marketing within 
Afghanistan.  The second factor that increased the opium 
production in Afghanistan was the deterioration of the 
Afghan rural economy.  Due to the conflict, the food 
production decreased by one-half to two-thirds, resulting 
in families looking for alternate means of money for 
survival.68  Opium provided this alternate means of money 
                     
65 Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the 
Taliban and al Qaeda (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2009), 29. 
66 Antonio M. Costa, "UNODC.org," The Opium Economy in Afghanistan, 
January 2003, www.unodc.org/pdf/publications/afg_opium_economy_www.pdf 




and needed support for the families of rural Afghanistan.  
The growing of opium provided three key factors to the 
farmers: it provided an excellent product to barter with, a 
line of credit, and an investment plan. Opium provided a 
product that had a high demand, which allowed the farmer 
trading power for food or other needed material.  The opium 
also allowed the farmer a line of credit.  This line of 
credit allowed the farmer to acquire seed and equipment, 
which was needed to produce future crops.  This often got 
the farmer into a never-ending cycle, which eventually 
enslaved the farmer to opium in order to pay off his debt 
and continue the support his family.  Opium also provided 
an individual the ability to save for future needs.  Opium 
is easily dried out and stored indefinitely.  This allows 
an individual to put away an amount of dry opium to cash in 
at a later date for the same or, possibly, an increased 
price, due to supply and demand. 
Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, opium 
production was embraced and maintained by a new group of 
individuals: warring factions.  These groups, attempting to 
carve out their own power base within Afghanistan, no 
longer had the support of external sponsors for their 
operation.  The opium trade provided these factions the 
money and, therefore, the weapons and manpower needed to 
build their power base.  The conflicts between the warring 
factions eventually led to the creation of the Taliban and 
its control of Afghanistan.  
2. The Taliban’s Opium Addiction 
The creation of the Taliban takes many forms and 
legends.  The Taliban, as it is considered today, can be 
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linked to the alleged actions taken by Mullah Mohammad Omar 
in mid-1994.  During this time, Afghanistan appeared to be 
in a state of anarchy.  The Soviets had been run out of the 
country but the warring factions within the country were 
causing chaos, making Afghanistan a nation-state on the 
brink of failure.  One version of the legend states that a 
family was traveling from Herat to Kandahar when they were 
stopped by bandits 90 kilometers outside of Kandahar.69  The 
men and women were separated, the boys were molested, the 
girls were raped multiple times, and later all the 
individuals were killed and partially burnt.70  It is said 
that Mullah Mohammad Omar found the bodies, gave them a 
proper burial, and pledged to rid the area of these 
criminals who committed this crime.  Following this action, 
Mullah Omar began going from mosque to mosque recruiting 
students in order to form an army to hunt down the 
criminals.  Another spin on this story is that the girls 
were being held captive by a warlord and Mullah Omar raised 
a force, freed the girls, and hung the warlord from a tank 
turret.71  No matter which version of the story you believe, 
the end result was the same: Mullah Omar was able to raise 
a formidable force, acquired weapons and vehicles for his 
people, and named the new group Tehreek-i-Islami-i-Taliban 
Afghanistan.  This force began to battle the warring 
factions in an attempt to bring peace to Afghanistan, and 
eventually gained control over a majority of the country.  
Mullah Omar was welcomed by the people of Afghanistan due 
                     
69 Kamal Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon (Karachi: Oxford 
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to the peace he brought and the good intentions presented 
by the Taliban at the outset.  The image presented by 
Mullah Omar and his followers was that he was appointed 
this duty by Allah himself.72   
Once the Taliban gained power in Afghanistan, they 
identified four goals; “(1) disarm all rival militia, (2) 
fight against those who did not accept their request to 
give up weapons, (3) enforce Islamic laws in the areas they 
‘liberated’ and (4) retain all areas the Taliban 
captured.”73  The one goal that the Taliban would appear to 
have difficulty adhering to was “the enforcement of Islamic 
law,” in relation to opium.74  The Taliban was very 
proficient at instituting their version of Islamic law.  As 
stated by James Emery, “the Koran bans the use and 
involvement with all intoxicants and mind-altering 
substances in the second surah, verse 219 and the fifth 
surah, verse 90.”75 Opium falls into the category of 
“intoxicants and mind-altering substances,” so it would 
appear to be banned according the Koran.  How did the 
Taliban treat this mind-altering substance and others like 
it?  When the Taliban first came into power, once they had 
captured Kandahar, they declared that all drugs would be 
eliminated from Afghanistan due to Islamic law.76  This 
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quickly changed once the Taliban realized how dependent the 
Afghan economy was on the opium trade and the possibility 
of losing the support of the Afghan people.  In order to 
justify their change of position on opium, the Taliban 
reinterpreted the meaning of the Islamic law.  This is best 
seen in a statement by an Afghan anti-drug cop, in the book 
Seeds of Terror, “opium is allowed because it is consumed 
by infidels in the West and not by Muslim Afghans.”77  The 
Taliban’s position on opium was even outlined in a book 
they issued, which laid out what was allowed under the 
Taliban’s version of sharia law.  Concerning opium, this 
book stated, “The consumption of opiates is forbidden, as 
is the manufacturing of heroin . . . but the production and 
trading of opium is not forbidden.”78  This rationalization 
for the Taliban’s opium culture allowed the regime to 
successfully support their operations and maintain support 
of the Afghan population.   
The Taliban would help finance the regime through the 
collection of a zakat, Islamic tax, on the opium trade. The 
zakat is an Islamic tax, which is dictated by the Koran to 
provide 2.5% of one’s disposable income to the poor.79  The 
Taliban would collect a zakat from the opium farmers, 
smugglers, dealers and producers.  The Taliban did not 
limit their zakat to only 2.5%; they increased it to 20% 
resulting in at least $20 million in revenue during their 
early years.80  This tax revenue allowed the Taliban regime 
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to function during global economic sanctions, helped to 
fund a military campaign against the Northern Alliance, and 
would eventually be used to fund the insurgent war against 
the U.S. and NATO Forces.81   
3. The Taliban’s Opium Ban 
The Taliban’s stance on opium did not change until 
July 2000, when a ban was placed upon the cultivation of 
opium.82  The Taliban’s ban on opium was one of the most 
effective bans imposed upon narcotics, resulting in an 
almost poppy-free Afghanistan.  How did the Taliban succeed 
in banning opium within one growing season?  This ban on 
opium was placed upon the country by Mullah Omar himself, 
by proclaiming the “growing of poppy a sin against Islam.”83  
This directive was passed down to the provincial governors, 
who advised their district administrators on the policy, 
and then the policy was explained to the local mullahs and 
elders.84  Once the local mullahs and elders understood the 
policy they explained it to the local farmers, who in most 
cases discontinued the cultivation of poppy.85  The framing 
of this policy change was very effective.  It appealed to 
the Afghan’s Islamic beliefs and by passing the directive 
down through local elders and religious leaders helped to 
demonstrate the legitimacy of the command.  The enforcement 
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of this ban appears to be mostly handled at the local level 
and punishment ranged from an apology and the destruction 
of the crop to the jailing of the individual and parading 
the offender through the town with a poppy necklace.  This 
ban was successful; however, it only lasted approximately a 
year due to the U.S. invasion in 2001.  It is unknown if 
the Taliban could have maintained the ban or how the 
economy and the people of Afghanistan would have been 
affected without the economic support of opium. 
There are many questions about the exact reason the 
Taliban banned the cultivation of poppy in 2000.  The 
outward appearance and the reason provided to the people of 
Afghanistan is that the Taliban banned opium due to 
religious reasons, a sin against Islam.  This stance begs 
one to ask why it took the Taliban six years to come to the 
conclusion that poppy cultivation was against the practices 
of Islam. They spent from 1994 to 1999 flooding the world 
with opium, with 1999 producing a record crop.86  The second 
reason that may have pushed the Taliban into their ban was 
pressure from the international community and pressure from 
their sponsors (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the United Arab 
Emirates). For years the international community had been 
placing pressure upon the Taliban regime to control the 
opium from Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the 
United Arab Emirates were the only countries to officially 
recognize the Taliban as a government and pressure from 
these governments to rid the country of opium could 
possibly have been an attempt to gain the Taliban more 
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legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. The 
third reason that may have pushed the Taliban to ban opium 
cultivation is pure greed.  Due to the increased 
cultivation of opium, peaking in 1999, the value of the 
drug had dropped.  By banning the cultivation of opium the 
Taliban decreased the supply of opium resulting in an 
increased value of their stockpiled dry opium.  This theory 
is supported by three factors.  First, the Taliban only 
banned the cultivation of opium; they did not ban the 
possession or sale of opium.  This would allow the drug 
business to continue in Afghanistan minus the cultivation, 
which would decrease the supply of the drug resulting in an 
increased value of the product coming out of Afghanistan.  
The second factor is that it is believed that the Taliban 
maintained a stockpile of dry opium.  With the ban on opium 
cultivation, the value of the opium would greatly increase 
resulting in a greater profit for the organization.  The 
third factor is the profit the Taliban receives in the drug 
operation.  As discussed before, the Taliban taxes all 
aspects of the drug trade.  The majority of their tax would 
come from the smugglers, traders, and laboratories within 
the business.  The tax from the farmers is a minor loss 
that the Taliban would recoup through the increased income 
received from the taxing of the drug smugglers, traders and 
laboratories. 
4. The Taliban and Opium, Post United States 
Invasion 
Following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 the 
Taliban was removed from power and was on the run.  They 
moved their base of operations into Pakistan and turned to 
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an old ally, opium, to help support their operations 
against the U.S. and NATO forces.  After the opium ban of 
2000 the value of opium increased.  From 2003-2007 
Afghanistan continued to increase the production of opium, 
which directly supported the Taliban through the taxation 
of the drug trade.  Even though the Taliban regime had been 
dislodged it still maintained its control over the opium 
trade.  They still provided security to opium smugglers, 
taxed the production, taxed the cultivation, and they also 
provide security to farmers from the new Afghan eradication 
force.  It is estimated that the Taliban collected 
approximately $100 million in 2003.87  This directly 
assisted the Taliban in buying weapons and vehicles, and in 
supporting operations. As of 2009, 90% of Afghanistan’s 
opium comes from seven provinces.88 These provinces are 
located in the southwestern portion of the country in the 
areas which lack security.89  These areas are prime areas 
for the Taliban to exert its control and influence over the 
population, especially the poppy farmers. 
C. AFGHANISTAN’S CURRENT COUNTERDRUG OPERATION 
The current counterdrug plan implemented by the 
Afghanistan government in 2007 is referred to as the Eight 
Pillar Plan.  The eight pillars consist of the following: 
(1) Public information, (2) Alternative development, (3) 
Elimination/ Eradication, (4) Interdiction, (5) Law 
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enforcement/ justice reform, (6) Demand reduction, (7) 
Institutional building, and (8) International and regional 
cooperation.90  
The first pillar, public information, puts out the 
counterdrug information to the people of Afghanistan.  This 
program could be considered the “Just say no!” campaign of 
Afghanistan.  This program began by using radio/ television 
messages, posters and billboards.  This appeared to be 
ineffective so the government turned to a tactic that was 
actually used by the Taliban for their ban on opium in 
2000.91  Just as the Taliban did in 2000 the new Afghan 
government began to rely on local leaders (tribal and 
religious), elders, police chiefs, district leaders, and 
teachers to spread their message about drugs.92 
The second pillar is alternative development.  This 
pillar provides alternatives to the cultivation of opium.  
These programs are usually focused in areas that have shown 
a reduction in poppy cultivation.93   
The third pillar is eradication.  If alternate 
development is the carrot, eradication can be considered 
the stick.  Eradication is conducted by the Afghan 
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eradication force.  The eradication force conducts all 
operations from the ground by hand.  Aerial spraying is not 
used in Afghanistan at this time. 
The fourth pillar, interdiction, focuses on the 
decrease of narcotic trafficking and processing. This 
program allows the DEA trained organizations of Afghanistan 
(Afghanistan Special Narcotics Force (ASNF), and the 
National Interdiction Unit (NIU) of the Counter Narcotics 
Police of Afghanistan (CNPA)) to target command and control 
elements of narcotics trafficking organizations.94 
The fifth pillar, law enforcement/ justice reform, 
focuses on building the legitimacy of the Afghan criminal 
system and law enforcement.  United States advisors mentor 
the Afghan Criminal Justice Task Force in their prosecution 
of narcotic and corruption cases. This program has also 
assisted with the building of 40 judicial facilities, 
distributed more than 11,000 copies of the Afghan 
Constitution, and trained more than 1,250 Afghan judges, 
lawyers, prosecutors, and corrections personnel.95 
The sixth pillar, demand reduction, targets the Afghan 
user.  This pillar creates drug abuse intervention, 
treatment, and recovery program.  These programs also 
utilize Muslim clerics who strongly support these programs 
to give them legitimacy.96 
The seventh pillar is institutional building.  This 
pillar targets the buildup of Afghan institutes, such as, 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Education, and 
                     




other institutions involved in the fight against drugs.97  
This pillar builds the legitimacy of the country and helps 
to focus all aspects of the drug campaign through 
government organizations.  
The eighth pillar is international and regional 
cooperation. Afghan opium has not only affected Afghanistan 
but has spilled its corruption and other issues over into 
neighboring countries. To battle this effect, the U.S. has 
established programs to assist in interdiction of narcotics 
and improve law enforcement programs within all neighboring 
countries (except Iran).98 The Central Asia Regional 
Information Coordination Center has also been established 
in the area to assist in information sharing and 
coordination.99  
1. Effectiveness of the Afghanistan’s Eight Pillar 
Plan 
In order to determine the effectiveness of the Afghan 
government’s counterdrug policy four factors will be 
examined: opium cultivation, amount of opium eradicated, 
number of people involved in the cultivation of opium, and 





                     




Figure 7.   Opium production in Afghanistan 
 
Sources: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. World Drug Report 
2009. Annual World Drug Report, New York: United Nations Publication 
Sales, 2009. 
 
Examining the cultivation of opium in Afghanistan from 
2007 to 2009 (figure 7) it does appear that the amount has 
decreased.  This appears to demonstrate that the Eight 
Pillar Plan is showing signs of success but this drop can 
also be linked to market forces rather than the application 
of policy.  This is demonstrated in a statement by Vanda 
Felbab-Brown, “After several years of massive 
overproduction in Afghanistan that surpassed the estimated 
global market for opiates by almost three times, opium 
prices were bound to decline.”100  According to this  
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statement the decrease of opium is related more to an 
oversupply of opium rather than the implementation of a 
successful counterdrug campaign. 
 
Table 2.   Opium cultivated and eradicated in Afghanistan 








4,210 15,300 19,510 5,480 5,351 
Sources: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Addiction, Crime 
and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium.” Research, 
New York: United Nations, 2009. 
 
Eradication in Afghanistan reached its high point in 
2007 (table 2).  From 2007 to 2009 the amount of 
eradication decreased as did the amount of opium 
cultivated.  As stated previously this could be linked to 
market effects. 
 
Table 3.   Persons involved in the Afghanistan opium 
cultivation 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Number of Persons 
involved in the opium 
cultivation (millions) 
1.7 2.3 2 2.9 3.3 2.4 3.4 
Sources: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Addiction, Crime 
and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium.” Research, 
New York: United Nations, 2009. 
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The number of persons involved in the cultivation of 
opium has hit an all time high in 2009 (Table 3).  The 
increase in individuals supporting the cultivation of opium 
can be seen as a direct failure of the Afghan Eight Pillar 
Plan.  The plan has failed at providing legal alternatives 
to cultivating opium resulting in the increased number. 
Figure 8.   Insurgent attacks in Afghanistan 
 
Sources: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Addiction, Crime 
and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium.” Research, 
New York: United Nations, 2009. 
A consistant increase in insurgent activity (Figure 8) 
can be seen above.  This demonstrates that the current 
Afghan plan has had little effect on the insurgency through 
their counterdrug plan.  The Taliban is still able to 
benefit from their participation in the opium trade 
resulting in increased levels of operations.   
D. UNITED STATES COUNTERDRUG POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN 
The United States supported the Afghanistan Eight 
Pillar Plan from 2007 until late 2009.  During this period 
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the United States counterdrug policy was called the Five 
Pillar Plan, which was based off the Afghan Eight Pillar 
Plan.  The United States plan focused on the first five 
pillars of the Afghan plan: (1) Public information, (2) 
Alternative development, (3) Elimination/ Eradication, (4) 
Interdiction, and (5) Law enforcement/ justice reform.101  
In late 2009, the Obama administration began to transition 
from the Five Pillar Plan.  The new United States policy on 
counterdrug operations in Afghanistan will phase out United 
States support for eradication.  The new policy places 
priority on agricultural development assistance and the 
intensification of interdiction efforts aimed at high 
level, insurgency linked traffickers.102 
E. CONCLUSION 
The current counterdrug plan in Afghanistan has been 
effective in some aspects; however, there can always be 
improvement.  The use of local leaders to spread their 
message about drugs should be applauded and reinforced.  
The people of Afghanistan are always going to respect and 
more likely adhere to any information or regulation if it 
is given or supported by a local compared to a U.S. or 
Afghan government official.  The improvements in law 
enforcement/ justice reform are commendable, but it will be 
difficult to measure the effectiveness of these efforts to 
weed out corruption in the Afghan system.  The coordination 
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and support of neighboring countries will be key to 
affecting the narcotic flow out of Afghanistan and in 
targeting drug organizations based outside of Afghanistan.  
The eight pillar concept is a good start to what is going 
to be a long battle against opium within Afghanistan. 
The United States’ decision to transition to a new 
policy that does not support eradication, prioritizes 
alternative development and interdiction is a step in the 
right direction.  These policies will assist the population 
of Afghanistan at the rural level providing them an 





The drug activity found within Afghanistan and 
Colombia are comparable in many ways.  Within this chapter, 
three similarities between the drug trade within these 
countries will be compared.  The similarities are the 
people’s reliance upon the drug trade, insurgent activity, 
and counterdrug operations.  Following this comparison the 
key lessons learned from the Colombian case study will be 
discussed.  The implementation of these lessons learned in 
Colombia will be examined for their usefulness in 
Afghanistan.  Policy recommendations will then be presented 
based on the findings.   
B. SIMULARITIES BETWEEN COLOMBIA AND AFGHANISTAN 
1. Population’s Reliance upon the Drug Trade 
The peoples of Afghanistan and Colombia have become 
reliant upon the drug trade.  The economy in Afghanistan 
has become in many ways an opium economy.  Vanda Felbab-
Brown stated, “Somewhere between a third and a half of its 
GDP comes from poppy cultivation and processing.”103  The 
formal economy of Afghanistan relies upon the reinvestment 
of the opium farmer.  This reliance on opium was 
demonstrated in 2005-2006 in eastern Afghanistan when opium  
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cultivation was reduced resulting in legitimate shopkeepers 
being forced out of business due to the decreased 
economy.104   
2. Insurgent Activity 
Colombia and Afghanistan have been rife with insurgent 
activity.  The government of Colombia’s main focus has been 
the FARC.  This organization for years established 
ungoverned area, which allowed the safe cultivation of 
coca.  This cultivation of coca assisted in the financing 
of the FARC’s operations throughout the region. 
The major threat at this time in Afghanistan is the 
Taliban.  Just as the FARC, the Taliban has established 
ungoverned areas where the cultivation of opium flourishes.  
This cultivation of opium has also been used to support 
combat operations of the Taliban. 
3. Counterdrug Operations 
The counterdrug operations conducted in Colombia and 
Afghanistan have been extremely similar.  The main focus in 
each of these countries has been the eradication of the 
drug crop.  Colombia has used a mixture of manual and 
aerial eradication in comparison to Afghanistan eradication 
consisting only of manual eradication. 
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C. LESSONS LEARNED FROM COLOMBIA 
1. Decrease in Governance Results in an Increase in 
Drug Cultivation 
A lesson that can be learned from the Colombia case 
study is that a decrease in state presence or governance 
will facilitate the cultivation of narcotics.  The limited 
presence of the state creates a vacuum, which the insurgent 
or criminal organization will fill by providing for the 
local community.  In the case of Colombia, these non-state 
organizations provide financial support to the locals 
through coca production.  This is demonstrated in Figure 9, 
where the increase population of non-state actors 
correlates to areas of coca cultivation.   
 
Figure 9.   Illegal armed groups and coca cultivation in 
Colombia 2008 
 
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Colombia Coca 
Cultivation Survey June 2009. Annual Coca Survey, New York: United 
Nations, 2009, 70. 
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As demonstrated in the PCIM program, the increase of 
state-sponsored infrastructure development, security and 
economic development led to the decrease in coca 
cultivation where implemented.  This program filled the 
vacuum that was previously occupied by the FARC, resulting 
in a decrease of coca cultivation from 2006-2007 to 2007-
2008, as seen in Figure 10. 
Figure 10.   Coca cultivation density change in PCIM area 
 
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Colombia Coca 
Cultivation Survey June 2009. Annual Coca Survey, New York: United 
Nations, 2009, 78. 
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This trend can also be identified in Afghanistan.  As 
seen in Figure 11, in areas where there is a lack of 
security, state presence or governance correlates to a 
higher rate of opium cultivation.  As utilized in the PCIM 
program of Colombia, the state needs to provide an 
increased presence through security, infrastructural 
improvements and economic development.  This increased 
presence will fill the vacuum, which the Taliban has filled 
at this time. 
Figure 11.   Security and opium poppy cultivation, 2009 
 Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Addiction, Crime and 
Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium. Research, New 
York: United Nations, 2009, 107. 
2. Eradication Negatively Affects Counterdrug 
Operations 
Throughout the fight against drugs in Colombia, the 
primary weapon used has been eradication.  Figure 12 shows 
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the effect that aerial and manual eradication has had upon 
the coca fields of Colombia.  It appears that eradication 
has assisted in maintaining levels of coca; however, it has 
been unsuccessful in stomping out the coca economy of 
Colombia. 
Figure 12.   Comparison of coca cultivation and cumulative 
sprayed and manually eradicated  
areas (hectares), 1998-2008 
 
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Colombia Coca 
Cultivation Survey June 2009. Annual Coca Survey, New York: United 
Nations, 2009, 76.  
 
Eradication affects the counterdrug operations 
negatively by driving the local populations toward non-
state actors.  Often the process of eradication, either by 
manual or aerial means, will result in the local population 
turning to the local non-state actor if the farmer is not 
offered an alternate source of income.  When a farmer’s 
crop is eradicated he considers this an act of taking food 
from his family.  In order to protect his family, the 
farmer will turn to the local insurgent for protection from 
the government eradication force.  The act of the 
population turning against the government elevates the  
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power and the authority of the insurgent force, resulting 
in the increase of the difficulty of the state to conduct 
counter-insurgent activities.   
The negative effect of eradication is a lesson that 
must be understood and utilized in Afghanistan.  The 
country is in a counter-insurgency battle, which is 
increasing in intensity.  The use of eradication in Taliban 
controlled areas will push the Afghan population further 
away from the Afghan government and coalition forces. 
D. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The implementation of any policy countering the opium 
trade in Afghanistan will be a long and resource intensive 
project.  To successfully counter the Afghan drug trade, 
one must take into consideration three factors: the 
motivations of farmers to grow opium, the amount of opium 
cultivation within each province, and the security and 
state presence found in each province.  Once these three 
factors have been analyzed they will then need to be 
implemented into a program modeled off the PCIM program 
from Colombia.  In conjunction with the implementation of 
this type of program, eradication efforts need to be 
discontinued and further research needs to be conducted to 
identify multiple legitimate crop replacements for opium.   
There is not a single driving motivation that 
influences all the Afghanistan farmers to produce opium.  A 
study was conducted in 2006 by the United Nations Office of 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) that summarized the motivations for 
opium cultivation as the following: “lack of rule of law; 
insecurity; lack of farm employment; lack of water and 
agricultural infrastructure; survival–provision of basic 
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needs; external pressure from traffickers and traders; 
exaggerated expectations of bilateral assistance through 
alternative livelihood activities and lack of coping 
strategies without opium poppy income.”105  These factors 
were then broken down into a table that broke the 
motivations down by regions, as seen in Table 4.  Utilizing 
this table, it is possible to identify the motivations of 
the opium farmers based on their designated regions.  The 
use of this knowledge will allow one to identify the 
motivation for each region that can be implemented to 
reduce opium cultivation.   
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Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Addiction, Crime and 
Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium. Research, New 
York: United Nations, 2009. 
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The next step is to identify the areas that have high 
levels of opium cultivation and low levels security/ low 
levels of state governance.  Figure 13, can be utilized to 
identify the key locations to begin the program.  Figure 13 
identifies the southern, western and eastern areas with the 
lowest levels of security/governance.  Figure 13 also 
identifies the provinces of Badghis, Daikundi, Uruzgan, 
Farah, Hilmand, Kandahar and Zabul as areas of increased 
opium cultivation (over 10,000 hectares). 
 
Figure 13.   Security and opium poppy cultivation, 2009 
 Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Addiction, Crime and 
Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium. Research, New 
York: United Nations, 2009, 107. 
 
If decision makers focus on the Daikundi province, the 
motivations for opium cultivation should be reviewed to 
determine where the focus will be needed when implementing 
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the Afghanistan version of the PCIM plan.  Table 4 
identifies that Daikundi, located in the central region, 
will need to focus on the role of Islam, respect of 
government, rule of law and security in order to reduce 
opium cultivation in this area.   
The following step would be to initiate the Afghanistan 
version of the PCIM plan focusing on the previously 
identified motivational factors.  Taking the Colombian PCIM 
template and integrating the motivational factors for the 
designated region the program would focus on institutional 
development, citizenship and governability; infrastructure 
and connectivity; access to public goods and social services; 
economic/ business development; and integration of religious 
leaders.  The key to this model is to secure the area with a 
local military presence.  Once the area is secure a police 
force will be brought in to continue providing security.  
During this time, non-military government officials will be 
brought in to establish contact with the local populace in 
order to begin the discussion of projects and activities 
needed in the community.  The use of non-military officials 
will allow the populace to become accustomed to working with 
government officials other than the military.  This allows a 
sense of trust to build between the community and the 
government.  This process will also allow local buy-in to the 
projects.  The benefit of this local buy-in is that it is not 
an outsider forcing a plan upon the local populace, which 
might not even be needed by the community.  The goal behind 
these projects, as in the Colombian project, is to spend 
small and fast in order to build confidence and provide rural 
people in areas where opium cultivation previously dominated 
with a “ladder” with which to climb out of the illegal 
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(narcotic) economy.106  Once this project has been 
successfully implemented in one province, the process will 
begin again in another province, with the intent to spread to 
all provinces. 
In conjunction with the implementation of the 
Afghanistan version of PCIM eradication and alternate crops 
must be addressed.  Eradication efforts will need to be 
terminated.  The termination of these efforts will prevent 
the negative effects brought on by eradication efforts, 
eliminating the alienation of the population.  Alternative 
crops must be researched and identified to replace the 
opium crop.  There cannot be one central crop to replace 
opium.  Research must be conducted to identify multiple 
crops that can be cultivated by the Afghan farmer so they 
are not dependent upon the market value of one product.   
The President of the United States has just announced 
an increase in troops to be deployed to Afghanistan.  This 
deployment can provide the needed security to the Afghan 
provinces to implement a PCIM type program, as implemented 
in Colombia.  In conjunction with the increased deployment 
of troops to Afghanistan, the new United States counterdrug 
policy will assist in the implementation of this type of 
program through its new priority on agricultural 
development assistance.  The difficulty of this program 
will be the governance that will need to be provided by 
Afghanistan.  This form of governance needs to come from 
the state level, district level, or provincial level.  
                     
106 Peter DeShazo, Phillip McLean, and Johanna Mendelson Forman, 
Colombia's Plan de Consolidacion Integral de la Macarena, Report of the 
CSIS Americas Program (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic 
International Studies, 2009), 6. 
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Without this governance there will be a vacuum that the 
Taliban will fill resulting in the failure of this type of 
program and the opium trade will continue to support 
Taliban operations.   
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